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SE TAX ON CRP PAYMENTS
— by Neil E. Harl*
The Tax Court, in a decision handed down on June 23, 1998,1 distinguished a 1996
Tax Court case with similar facts2 and held that conservation reserve payments
(CRP)3 are not subject to self-employment tax.4  The question is whether the
Wuebker decision5 will stand and whether the holding will be extended to all income
properly classified as “rents” whether the rents are from real or personal property.6
The Wuebker decision
In Wuebker v. Commissioner,7 the taxpayer bid 214 acres of farmland into the 10-
year CRP program.8  While the land accepted into the CRP program represented all
of the taxpayer’s owned tillable land, the taxpayer continued to farm rented land on a
crop-share basis and continued to raise laying hens on their own land which was
contiguous to the CRP land.9  The taxpayer established ground cover on the CRP
land using the same equipment used previously on the CRP land when farmed and
presumably the same equipment used in the crop-share operations on rented land.
The taxpayer reported the CRP payments as “rent” on Schedule E and did not pay
self-employment tax on the income.10
The Tax Court, in reaching its conclusion that CRP payments are not subject to
self-employment tax, began by noting that, in order to be subject to self-employment
tax, income must be derived from a trade or business carried on by the individual.11
Echoing Ray v. Commissioner,12  the case distinguished by the Wuebker court, the
court proceeded to point out that there must be a nexus between the income received
and the trade or business carried on for the income to become subject to self-
employment tax.13  The court then made the point that the self-employment income
statute14 is to be “construed broadly” to “favor coverage for Social Security
purposes.”15
Having said all of that, the court in Wuebker aligned itself with the taxpayer’s
argument that the CRP contract used the word “rental” and Congress must have
intended for the payments to be excluded from self-employment income because they
presumably knew, “that rental income is excluded from self-employment income.”16
More precisely, “rentals from real estate and from personal property leased with the
real estate” are excluded from self-employment income.17
The court addressed the nature of the rental payment in stating that the CRP
payments “represented compensation for the use restrictions imposed on the land,
rather than remuneration for petitioner’s labor.”18  The primary purpose of the CRP
contract was “to effectuate the statutory intention of converting highly erodible
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croplands to soil conserving uses.”19
The court concluded by stating that, because the
payments are characterized as rents, “even if such
payments were derived from petitioner’s farming
operations, the payments would not be includible in
petitioner’s earnings from self-employment.”20
The earlier CRP case
In the 1996 Tax Court decision, Ray v. Commissioner,21
the court examined a factual situation similar to Wuebker.
In Ray, the farmer owned a substantial amount of land
which was used in the taxpayer’s farming and cattle raising
operation.  The taxpayer purchased an additional tract of
land which had been bid into the CRP program by the prior
owner.22  The Tax Court stated that the payments received
under the CRP program had a “direct nexus” to the
taxpayer’s business of farming.23  Accordingly, the
payments were included in self-employment income and
subject to self-employment tax.
Distinguishing Ray
So how did the Tax Court in Wuebker v. Commissioner 24
distinguish Ray v. Commissioner?25  The Wuebker court
said simply that “the Court [in Ray] did not address
whether the payments qualified under the rental exclusion
provisions of section 1402(a)(1).”26
Lessons from Wuebker
If Wuebker v. Commissioner 27 is not appealed or is
upheld on appeal, what lessons can be learned from the
decision?
• The narrowest construction of Wuebker is that
government program payments characterized as rents by
the federal government will be considered as rents for self-
employment tax purposes regardless of the relationship to
an on-going farm business (the “direct nexus”).  In this
regard, it is important to note that the court in Wuebker
pointed out that the key revenue ruling in this area, Rev.
Rul. 60-32,28 did not address in that ruling whether the
payments constituted rentals.29
• Presumably, the treatment of rentals from personal
property leased with real estate would be treated the same.30
• For rentals involving personal property not leased with
the real estate, the situation is less clear.31  In a 1989 case, a
taxpayer conducting a business involving the sale of
portable advertising signs and a separate rental operation
could not exclude the rental payments from self-
employment income.32  The court was not impressed with
the taxpayer’s argument that the statutory language,
“...rentals from real estate and from personal property
leased with the real estate ,” should be read to permit
exclusion of rentals from personal property not rented with
real estate.33  Indeed, that case apparently touched off the
IRS audit position in the early 1990s based on the assertion
that all rentals on personal property were subject to self-
employment tax.34
• The key question in light of Wuebker is whether rentals
clearly classified as such but not part of a government
program referring specifically to payments as “rentals” will
be excluded from self-employment income.  The answer to
that question is not clear.  A convincing argument can be
made that substance, not form, should prevail and payments
properly classifiable as rent should be treated the same as
the payments in Wuebker v. Commissioner.35
Demise of “nexus”?
Finally, Wuebker poses the question whether the “direct
nexus” requirement articulated in earlier cases36 is dead
where the payment is of “rent.”  A reading of Wuebker
would support that conclusion, at least where the rentals are
paid pursuant to a government program specifically
referring to “rents.”
Keep in mind, however, that if there is sufficient
involvement under a lease to amount to “material
participation,” even “rents” become subject to self-
employment tax.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE. The property dispute arose from the placement,
more than 40 years ago, of a fence too far on to the
defendant’s property. The plaintiff had maintained the
fence for over 30 years and the parties or their predecessors
had recognized the fence as the boundary between the two
properties. The defendant argued that the doctrine of
acquiescence of a fence did not apply because the fence did
not fully enclose the disputed property. The evidence
demonstrated that a gap existed at the end of the fence
when a creek receded during dry months but that the fence
reached the water in wet months. The court held that the
natural boundary of the creek would be included to
determine whether the fence completely enclosed the
disputed property and upheld the trial court award of title to
the disputed property to the plaintiff. Lindgren v. Martin,
949 P.2d 1061 (Idaho 1997).
ANIMALS
DOGS. The defendant county had ordered the plaintiff’s
dog to be destroyed under Or. Stat. § 609.155(3)(a) because
the dog had chased a horse owned by a third party in the
third party’s pasture. There was no evidence that the horse
was injured or that the dog had attempted to harm the
horse. The plaintiff argued that the statute required proof of
injury or intent to injure. The court held that the statute was
clear that merely chasing livestock was an action that
required that the dog be put to death. Roach v. Jackson
County, 949 P.2d 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT. The debtors filed for
Chapter 7 in December 1995 and claimed their 1995 earned
income tax credit as exempt under Okla. Stat. tit. 31, §
1(A)(19) which allowed an exemption for “alimony,
support, separate maintenance or child support payments to
the extent reasonably necessary for the support of such
person and any dependent of such person.” The court noted
that such payments usually result from a divorce decree but
that the statute did not restrict the exemption to divorce
decree payments. The court held that the purpose of the
earned income tax credit was the support of families with
children and allowed the exemption. In re George, 98-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,588 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor was of advanced age and
poor health. Three years before filing for bankruptcy, the
debtor moved to a nursing home but had since moved in
with a daughter who provided medical care. The debtor’s
other two daughters lived in the debtor’s residence. The
debtor argued that the residence still was eligible for the
homestead exemption because the debtor’s absence from
the residence was involuntary, due to poor health and need
of care. The court held that the evidence did not
demonstrate any necessity that the debtor move out of the
residence but only that it was more convenient for the
daughter who cared for the debtor. The court also noted
that the eligibility for the exemption relied more on
physical presence than personal intent and held that the
residence was not eligible for the exemption. Matter of
Burns, 218 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1998).
The debtor owned a 42 acre property on which the
debtor’s residence was located. The property was located
within city limits and city sewer and water hookups were
available to the property but not used. The city provided
fire and police protection for the property. The property
was surrounded by residential subdivisions and the
property was zoned for residential use. The court held that
the property was an urban homestead, limited to an
exemption of one acre. Matter of Crowell, 138 F.3d 1031
(5th Cir. 1998).
    Chapter 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN INTEREST. This ruling involved two unrelated
Chapter 12 cases in which the Bankruptcy Court had set an
interest rate on payments on secured claims as equal to the
rate for U.S. Treasury instruments of similar duration. The
cases were appealed but sent back to the Bankruptcy Court
in light of new decisions. During the appeals in these cases,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided In re Valenti,
105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997), which held that the basic
interest rate should not have any factor for a “coerced loan”
aspect of the plan payments. However, Valenti, held that
the interest rate should be adjusted for a risk of default
factor. The issue was further affected by the holding in
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879
(1997), which held that any risk factor was to be included
in the value of the claim before the interest rate was
determined. The Bankruptcy Court held that the U.S.
